The European Union (EU), currently composed of 27 Member States, operates under a system in which certain areas of governmental responsibility have been transferred to the EU level. These are defined as either shared competences, where both the EU and Member States may legislate, or exclusive competences, where only the EU may adopt legally binding acts. The conservation of marine biological resources under the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) falls under the EU’s exclusive competence, meaning it is regulated solely at the EU level on behalf of all Member States. The CFP governs all fishing activities carried out by EU vessels, both within EU waters and in the waters of non-EU countries. It must be implemented in line with broader EU legislation and the international treaties and agreements to which the EU is a party. The CFP also provides the legal basis for negotiating bilateral agreements with third countries, known in the EU context as “Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreements (SFPAs)”, which allow EU distant water fleets to operate in foreign Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) under agreed terms of the SFPA. This article examines the legal basis of SFPAs, the obligations imposed on vessels operating under them, and the legal and practical challenges these agreements can present.
Legal Basis for Europe’s Distant Water Fishing in EEZs
Distant Water Fishing Vessels flagged to an EU Member State, most frequently Spain or France, will be granted access to a third country’s EEZ through these SFPAs. These Agreements are negotiated by the European Commission on behalf of EU Member States. The basis for this under European Law can be found in Article 218 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). Any conduct under the SFPAs must be consistent with the objectives of the Common Fisheries Policy (Regulation (EU) No 1380/2013).
We can also pinpoint an international legal basis for such “Access Agreements”. Agreeing to such Agreements with third countries is allowed under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which grants coastal states sovereign rights over marine resources within their EEZs up to 200 nautical miles from shore. Article 61 of UNCLOS stipulates that “the coastal State shall determine the allowable catch of the living resources in its exclusive economic zone.” Article 62(3) allows for access by foreign vessels, stating “In giving access to other States to its exclusive economic zone under this article, the coastal State shall take into account all relevant factors, including, inter alia, the significance of the living resources of the area to the economy of the coastal State concerned and its other national interests […].”
The European Union has been concluding fisheries Access Agreements with third countries since the 70s. There are two main types of SFPAs:
Tuna Agreements, which allow EU vessels to follow highly migratory tuna stocks, particularly along the coasts of Africa and in the Indian Ocean.
Mixed Agreements, which cover access to a broader range of species in a partner country’s EEZ.
Currently active Agreements include those with Mauritania, The Gambia, Cabo Verde, and Guinea Bissau. Former agreements with Senegal, Liberia, Côte d’Ivoire, Morocco, and others are now “dormant”, meaning the SFPA is still in place but there is no activity. Spanish-flagged vessels are the main beneficiaries, with Spain alone accounting for approximately 10% of global distant water fishing activity. According to a study by the Financial Transparency Coalition, just five countries (China, Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, and Spain) are responsible for 90% of global DWF effort. Zooming in on the region that seems to have most SFPAs with the EU, West Africa, some NGOs report that Spanish companies are responsible for 73% of foreign fishing activity.
According to the EU, SFPAs allow European vessels to fish “surplus stocks”, meaning stocks that the partner country’s fleet is not fully exploiting. In return, the EU makes an annual financial contribution to the partner country. This financial contribution is seen as compensation for EU vessels accessing the country’s EEZ, with a specific portion of the contribution assigned to “Sectoral support”. The latter should be seen as funding to support the partner country’s fisheries sector, including sustainability efforts, monitoring and control, research, and capacity-building. Annual financial contributions given under SFPAs ranges from €725,000 (Kiribati) to €60.8 million (Mauritania). The number of vessels granted access and the catch limits are outlined in a Protocol attached to each SFPA. It goes without saying that the financial contribution is directly linked to the scale of access granted under the agreement.
Common Critiques on SFPAs
The European Commission states its SFPAs are a “benchmark for good fisheries governance”. I do wonder whose benchmark they are referring to here, as there is certainly plenty of (valid) critiques on the SFPAs. Many of the countries with which the EU signs these agreements are classified by the FAO as Low-Income Food-Deficit Countries (LIFDCs). These are countries that both: 1) Have a per capita income below the World Bank’s threshold for low-income economies, and 2) Struggle to produce or import enough food to meet domestic needs.
Further, many of the third countries are located in Sub-Saharan Africa, where fisheries are already under threat of Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing, as 40% of the world’s documented cases of IUU are reported to take place here. It is therefore not surprising that the SFPAs leads to concern, as these agreements primarily serve the interests of distant water fleets, not the coastal communities of the third countries. Based on my past research and recent articles, there are a number of common critiques I would like to highlight:
1. Tensions Between Legal Commitments
Countries in the Global North, including EU Member States, uphold the right to food and the right to work in international forums. Yet these same countries negotiate fisheries access in nations where small-scale fishing is critical to livelihoods and food supply. Payments from SFPAs often do not reach the communities who are most affected by reduced local fishing opportunities. Instead, funds typically go to national budgets or ministries, with limited transparency or accountability over how sectoral support is spent.
2. Opaque Operations and Limited Transparency
Despite their environmental and social impact, DWF operations are often shrouded in secrecy. Vessel operators can exploit legal loopholes through chartering, joint ventures, or reflagging. Many of these arrangements are kept out of public view. Civil society organisations have repeatedly called for full transparency of access agreements and beneficial ownership of vessels. For example, EU-flagged vessels have been accused of using Senegalese-registered vessels to circumvent foreign ownership restrictions, as documented in this article by Follow the Money.
3. Reported Violations and Non-Compliance
In principle, all activities carried out under SFPAs must comply with the rules of the EU’s Common Fisheries Policy (CFP), including the requirement for vessels to keep their Automatic Identification System (AIS) active to ensure transparency and enable monitoring of their movements. However, analysis by Global Fishing Watch revealed that Spanish-flagged vessels operating in Guinea-Bissau’s EEZ frequently disabled their AIS for extended periods. In response to this pattern of non-compliance, Client Earth recently filed a lawsuit against the Spanish authorities for failing to take action against repeated AIS shutdowns by vessels fishing in West Africa. Reports of violations of the CFP’s regulations or even illicit activity by vessels fishing under SFPAs is not uncommon and reports come out regularly.
4. Misuse of “Surplus Stocks” Narrative
The EU justifies its access to third-country fisheries on the basis that it targets only “surplus” stocks. However, this rationale becomes difficult to defend in countries grappling with food insecurity. Many SFPA partner states are classified by the FAO as Low-Income Food-Deficit Countries (LIFDCs), where national food supply and local livelihoods are already under strain. The concept of “surplus” thus appears more political than socio-economic.
5. Power Imbalances in Negotiations
While they may be perfectly legal under UNCLOS or EU Law: SFPAs are not negotiated in a vacuum. As several legal scholars have noted, access agreements are often intertwined with broader economic and political negotiations. Coastal states may feel pressured to accept terms that prioritise EU economic interests in exchange for aid, trade deals, or political favour. This may result in benefits for the EU Member States, but losses for host countries in terms of depleted resources, diminished food sovereignty, and lost livelihoods.
We hope this article provided you with helpful insights! Want to learn more about EU’s Common Fisheries Policy and/or the legality of Distant Water Fishing? Leave us a comment below!
Curious about what these Sustainable Fisheries Partner Agreements look like? They are freely available on the European Commission website. Example of Cabo Verde can be found here
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