Recently, I found myself back on familiar ground, both literally and intellectually. I was walking the halls of the law school where I earned my Master’s International and European law, this time as a visitor of the Mare conference. As during my studies, human rights was a recurring theme. While I was generally impressed by the speaker’ expertise and refreshing perspectives, I was, just like during my Master’s, struck by a lack of critical reflection on how much we can expect from international human rights law.
Let me be clear: my discontent isn’t directed at the principle of human rights. Nor of the fundamental rights that are often guaranteed in national constitutions or in regional treaties. My concern is the lack of critical thinking when discussing international human rights guidelines. And when it comes to fisheries, the tendency to simplify their application. Especially in the context where human rights violations are assumed most likely: industrial fisheries operating in areas beyond national jurisdiction.
In my experience, many critiques on human rights have centred around the fact that international treaties seem to primarily reflect European values, and worst case even deployed as tools to quiet those don’t fit this mould. This is a very valid discussion, but not one I will go into here. Simply because I believe there are others better suited to lead that conversation than me: someone who is European-born, of European descent, and European-educated.
What I would like to examine are the practical shortcomings of human rights law as applied within the international legal framework governing industrial fishing. The material provisions (articles) of the law represent only part of the picture, and an incomplete one if we fail to consider the procedural and contextual elements, such as legal standing, jurisdiction, and enforceability, that determine when and how these rights can be invoked. I want to highlight three practical aspects that show how these well-meaning efforts may not be effective in practice.
1. National Laws, Global Harm: Jurisdictional Limits of Human Rights in Industrial Fisheries
A first limitation of human rights law stems from its jurisdictional reach, that is, where and by whom these rights can be enforced. Human rights protections are primarily implemented and upheld in a national context; nearly all enforcement mechanisms are tied to a specific State’s (in)actions towards its citizens. The problems caused by industrial fisheries, however, are inherently international. Fish don’t recognise borders, and neither do the adverse consequences of practices like overfishing, habitat destruction, or exploitative labour practices.
Consider a common scenario involving Distant Water Fishing Vessels (DWFV). These vessels operate far from their home ports; their activities may take place within the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) or near the EEZ of a Coastal State, or on the high seas (belonging to no State in particular). Their crew will frequently come from States entirely different from the one where the vessel is flagged. This creates a situation where responsibility and accountability are scattered: the State that permits or fails to prevent human rights violations (the Flag State) is typically different from both the state whose nationals are harmed (the crew’s home country), and from the state whose waters might be exploited (the Coastal State). For example, imagine you are a crew member from State A, working on a ship flagged by State B, operating in the EEZ or on the high seas off State C. If your rights are violated, such as the right to freedom of association, the prohibition of forced labour, or the right to fair conditions of work (all set out in two key international human rights treaties, the ICCPR and ICESCR), it becomes extremely difficult to hold any State effectively accountable. Because of overlapping jurisdictions, victims of labour abuse in this sector are often left without clear legal recourse, while those responsible may exploit these legal challenges.
Positive news in this context is that there is an emerging trend to recognise State responsibility in the context of transboundary harm. This recognition is particularly given in the context of climate change, but is also gaining ground as theory of extraterritorial human rights obligations. Practical concerns remain, as the path from legal principle to legal remedy remains unclear. An affected individual in a distant coastal State has no automatic standing in the courts of the flag State (unless that State allows foreign nationals to sue over extraterritorial harm, which is rare). And international human rights law doesn’t create universal standing across jurisdictions.
2. The Mirage of Protection
Another concern is not necessarily the result of human rights treaties themselves, but rather with how human rights are referenced by scholars or those working for fisheries sustainability initiatives. The legal status of many instruments commonly cited in these discussions around fisheries and human rights is more uncertain than some scholars admit. I am repeatedly frustrated by the casual referencing of voluntary international guidelines, NGO products, or industry certifications as if they were binding international law. While such efforts may represent genuine progress and are worth celebrating in their own right, blurring the lines between them and binding international agreements can create an illusion of protection. It allows policymakers, companies, NGOs, or even academics to claim progress in the context of human rights law, where in practice little or none exist. There is a possible scenario where non-binding commitments or resolutions may become binding obligations as customary international law, but for this to happen, they must be widely and consistently followed by States, and regarded by States as legally binding. This, however, has not (yet) been the case for any of the documents I frequently see referenced.
In an era where we fail to provide protection even in situations where the illegality and gravity of acts is universally acknowledged, such as the ongoing genocide in Palestine, it become all the more evident that we should not be treating voluntary agreements and non-binding codes as if they were primary sources of law. Good intentions aside, wishful thinking is harmful when people’s lives and physical integrity are at stake. I would much rather see lawyers embrace their role as bearers of bad news than promoting the myth that law always equals justice, and that the only problem is insufficient enforcement. And I say this as someone who has firmly believed in the power of law to protect people and planet since the age of 12, and I still do. But true advances in international legal protection are more likely to come through hard-won litigation, pushing the boundaries of human rights law. Not by pretending the work is done by referencing a wide set of instruments that have little to no legal value.
3. Redirecting Focus to a Broader System of Laws impacting Human Rights in Practice
My point is not that we should abandon international human rights law, far from it. Rather, I argue we should be more pragmatic, and ultimately more effective, if we also focused our attention on dismantling the unfair systems that allow the violations to persist in the first place. Of course, this is no small task. Many of these systems are unfair by design and maintained through deliberate inaction. Take, for example, the European Union’s “Sustainable” Fisheries Partnership Agreements (SPFAs) with African States and Small island Developing States (SIDS). It is hardly a revelation that many coastal communities would fare better if these agreements were discontinued, rather than propped up with EU’s development aid. But that does not mean we should stop fighting the existence of unfair and backwards practices.
If we look at progress in ensuring the fisheries-related human rights in this context, there is reason for hope. For instance, Panama’s recent commitment to enhance transparency around beneficial ownership data targets one of these unfair systems that allow the violations to persist. For a State known to be a Flag of Convenience, this may be a pretty big deal. Structural legal reform marks real progress, as these reforms address the core architecture of human rights violations in fisheries. And that could bring us one step closer to the responsible, equitable sector we urgently need.
Conclusion
I know I am probably not making myself popular by saying anything negative about human right or those defending them. I genuinely hope I have not insulted anyone who identifies as a human right defender, but if I have, here’s what I’d say: I believe many of us are human rights defenders, even if we spend very little of our time talking about them directly. At the end of the day, international human rights can and should embody the highest ideals our legal systems strive to uphold.But I just don’t believe we’ll get there if only lawyers specialising in human rights law will focus on the fisheries sector. We need experts and advocates from different legal specialities, people who truly understand how these intersecting legal systems impact fisheries, and who are willing to push lawmakers and judges to do better. Just because human rights may not be in your job title, does not mean you are not still fighting for a world where they receive better protection. And vice versa.
Concerning the reference to human rights outside of a legal work, I would like to emphasise the following. Do I think we should have more recognition of human rights in any public or corporate policy? One hundred percent. Should we be cheering for the growing recognition of environmental or socio-economic human rights at national and regional courts? Abso-f*cking-lutely. But I do believe this can and should coexist with thinking critically about practical limitations, and manage our expectations accordingly.
Leave a Reply